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What lies beneath? Some notes on ultra-realism, and the intellectual foundations of the 
‘deviant leisure’ perspective 
 
Simon Winlow, Northumbria University 
 
In this brief paper, I explore the links between the developing deviant leisure perspective and 
ultra-realism, a theoretical paradigm developed over many years by Steve Hall and I (see, for 
example, Hall et al, 2008; Hall, 2012a, b; Hall and Winlow, 2015; Winlow, 2001, 2014; 
Winlow and Hall, 2009, 2012, 2013). I will describe in very simple terms ultra-realism’s 
intellectual framework before discussing how deviant leisure scholars might use these 
resources to solidify the intellectual foundations of their project.  
 
What is ultra-realism? 
At the core of ultra-realism lies an original account of contemporary subjectivity as it acts in 
its socioeconomic context (see Hall, 2012a, b; Hall and Winlow, 2015; Winlow and Hall, 2013. 
See also Ellis, 2016; Raymen, 2015; Smith and Raymen, 2016; Wakeman, 2017). For ultra-
realists, many of the 20th century’s key theoretical paradigms are flawed not simply at the level 
of analysis; they are flawed at the foundational level. Authors working within these paradigms 
brush over, simplify and misconstrue the true complexity of human subjectivity, and, as a 
consequence, they are unable to identify the fundamental forces that drive individuals to act in 
ways that harm others and our shared environments. Many of these paradigms develop from 
an unacknowledged commitment to the old philosophical tropes of innate goodness and innate 
selfishness. For example, many of the theories that are gathered together under the umbrella of 
‘left idealism’ (Young, 1975) assume that the subject is rational, essentially good and willing 
to struggle for freedom against the various repressive agencies of the state and the market. Left 
idealism’s traditional political and intellectual opponents tend to assume the opposite. 
Conservative criminologists (see, for example, Hirschi, 1969) develop their analyses from the 
basic assumption that the individual is dangerous and potentially evil and therefore must be 
controlled and civilised by modern social and governmental institutions. To complicate 
matters, right-wing liberals tend to disagree with right-wing conservatives, and often appear to 
endorse an interpretation of subjectivity that is more in keeping with their liberal cousins on 
the political left. For them, the individual is essentially a rational and self-interested hedonist 
who can be encouraged to make the right choices by a functional social order and the core 
institutions of a minimal state. Others see the self simply as an object created and directed by 
the immediate social environment (for example, Shaw and McKay, 1972; Sutherland et al, 
1995), and others still position the individual as a flexible agent periodically transformed, 
oppressed or liberated by ‘narratives’, ‘discourse’, and the vicissitudes of power and language 
(for example, Foucault, 2000; Milovanovic, 1997). Ultra-realists, then, begin by dismissing 
these paradigms as moribund and intellectually flawed. Ultra-realists hope to rid themselves of 
any vestigial attachment to our discipline’s dominant liberal and conservative intellectual 
traditions, in the hope that they might rethink subjectivity and the manifold problems that litter 
our shared environments.  
 
Implicit in this drive to think and act anew is a desire to reinvigorate the discipline of 
criminology and set it to the task of explaining – rather than simply describing – new and long-
standing social problems. Ultra-realists often claim that academic criminology has become 
intellectually barren. Descriptive, empirical accounts of policing and criminal justice practices, 
with little or no explanatory power, now occupy the centre of our discipline. Political and 
intellectual radicalism, such important features of our discipline’s past, are now desperately 
hard to sustain in the neoliberal university. Vapid careerism is endemic – an inevitable 
outcome, given the aggressive marketization of the university and the dumbing down of politics 
and culture – and contemporary academic careers are now forged in the white heat of 
competition. We must all be brilliant, productive, entertaining and inspiring all of the time. It 
is very difficult for genuine radicals to win research funding, and it can also be difficult for 
radicals to publish a new idea – one that does not utilise or rely upon canonical texts – in our 
major journals. Rather, grants tend to be given to criminologists who display resolute faith in 
parliamentary capitalism and the ability of the neoliberal state to solve social problems with 
carefully calibrated social policy interventions, and those who seek only to modify existing 
theoretical frameworks find it easier to publish their work than those who seek to reject existing 
theoretical frameworks in their entirety.  
 
Critique aimed at the political right remains very common, and criminologists are often quick 
to chastise sitting governments for policy errors and their ongoing refusal to draw upon existing 
social research when attempting to tackle social problems. However, if nothing changes as a 
result of this sustained critique, if the basic foundations of our economy remain in place and 
problems continue to arise, then we should perhaps begin to wrestle with the possibility that 
such critique is part of the system it appears to strenuously oppose. Perhaps such critique – 
which accepts the continuation of capitalism and the dominance of markets, and refuses to 
think through the problem of democracy – contributes to the continuation of a system that 
works against the basic precepts of a civilised and inclusive society? Does the reformist critic 
not play a role in maintaining the pretence of democratic accountability? Does the formulaic 
and stage-managed debate we see play out in newspapers and on news broadcasts not act to 
drive home the myth that politics remains alive and well and that power is constantly held to 
account? In his focus on small matters of policy, does the domesticated, reformist critic not 
ensure that the public is denied access to a critique that draws into question the very foundations 
of our present way of life? Criticism of the system is welcomed if that criticism remains 
generally reformist in nature. The population must be constantly reassured that the next general 
election offers the opportunity to change things. However, those forms of criticism that identify 
the continuation of the system itself as the principal issue at stake are usually side-lined, and 
rarely are genuine radicals given a major platform from which to speak. For ultra-realists, it is 
vital that we return to depth critique and reassert our right to construct new ways of interpreting 
the world. We must recognise that the imperative to be ‘policy relevant’ enforces firm limits 
on what can be thought and said. If we still hope to identify the fundamental causes of crime 
and harm, we must go deeper.  
 
Ultra-realists refuse to engage in the standard practice of returning to established theories and 
core texts when a new social problem presents itself. The application of the mid-twentieth 
century criminological theory to twenty-first century social problems only rarely assists us in 
the task of constructing adequate explanations for and responses to the panoply of problems 
experienced by diverse populations in the real world. In the present conjuncture, critical social 
scientists often appear to be working in the dark with out-of-date tools. Many of the social 
science’s key themes and theories reference a world that no longer exists. While we must retain 
and work with concepts and ideas that can help us to understand the problems we face, 
regardless of their disciplinary origin, we must also be brave enough to discard out-of-date 
ideas that may provide a little comfort and familiarity but do not help us explain the gradual 
breaking apart of modernity’s partial achievements and the subsequent social problems that 
appear to arise like the sun with each new day. Ultra-realists argue that we must recognise and 
acknowledge that many of the problems we face now are, in fact, genuinely new. We now 
occupy the Anthropocene era. Our social and political structures, our cultural life, the global 
economy and the natural environment have all changed enormously since criminology’s early 
days. We cannot simply draw upon established intellectual frameworks and expect new truths 
to be revealed to us. We must scour the social sciences, the humanities and the natural sciences 
for research and ideas that have the power to illuminate the problems we face now. We must 
also have the courage to produce intellectual frameworks of our own. Criminology continues 
to think of itself as an importer discipline. But, now our infancy is well behind us and given 
the fact that we have grown enormously in recent years, shouldn’t we attempt to produce and 
export a few ideas of our own? For years criminology has, for the most part, utilised the tools 
handed to us by 20th century liberal sociology, but these tools are no longer fit for purpose, and 
the intellectual frameworks currently in vogue in sociology fail to tell us anything of genuine 
importance about the decomposition of civil society. Nor do they help us to think through what 
might become of our collective life in the years ahead. Criminologists should now display the 
confidence needed to step out of sociology’s shadow and take the lead in explaining the 
problems of our time. Criminology cannot be allowed to be turned into yet another sterile and 
factionalised social science, dismissive of new and challenging viewpoints, dedicated only to 
identifying populations who deserve sympathy, governmental assistance and the opportunity 
to improve their position within the system as it stands. It should go without saying that our 
job as social scientists is not simply to promote a liberal world-view. Our job as criminologists 
is to investigate the real world and construct honest and objective accounts of it before 
committing to the demanding task of explaining the problems we find there with as much 
creativity, imagination and rigorous and informed scholarly insight as we can muster.  
 
Background 
Ultra-realism has a range of diverse influences. From within the broad field of criminology, 
the subfields of victimology, feminism and left realism are notable. Key authors and 
researchers working in these areas attempted, at various points in our discipline’s history, to 
break away from criminology’s dominant explanatory frameworks. They also hoped to jolt the 
discipline out of its intellectual myopia and self-satisfied inertia and force it to look again at 
reality. Ultra-realism retains the drive to return to reality and to represent it truthfully, but, in 
the standard dialectical manner, it hopes to advance upon the intellectual gains made by these 
authors and researchers, and, where necessary, reject entirely aspects of their work. For 
example, modern victimology challenged social constructionist accounts of the crime problem 
and drew attention to the genuine harms experienced by victims. The radical liberal 
criminologists of the sixties and seventies argued that crime is simply a social construct 
moulded by those who possess social power. The basic goal of these powerful actors, the 
radical liberals argued, is to criminalise deviants, reassert conventionality and in so doing 
maintain existing hierarchies and the conservative social order upon which they depend. 
However, for inhabitants of crime-ridden locales – or those victimised in a more direct manner 
by unjustly labelled ‘deviants’ – crime often corrodes, damages and wounds. The social, 
cultural, economic and psychological effects of crime upon victims are very often significant 
and left-liberal academics who blithely brush away these effects to promulgate their tired anti-
authoritarian message teach us nothing about the reality of crime and contribute little of 
genuine value to our discipline’s well-being.  
 
Victimology’s drive to investigate the effects of crime upon victims and its willingness to 
engage in speculative accounts of offender motivation have influenced ultra-realism, but ultra-
realists are keen to utilise more rigorous models of subjectivity and construct better accounts 
of motivation and the internal life of the criminal actor (see for example Hall et al, 2008). In a 
similar way, feminist accounts of male violence revealed the intellectual errors of left idealist 
accounts of the crime and criminalisation. Early feminists unearthed a troubling reality in 
which female victims suffered greatly, and the police and the criminal justice system – rather 
than unfairly labelling and punishing offenders – ignored, failed to protect and stigmatised 
female victims of male violence. Ultra-realists acknowledge the huge contribution made by 
feminist scholars to the advancement of criminology. However, ultra-realists also claim that, 
as feminist accounts of female crime and victimhood were integrated in the discipline’s 
mainstream, the field of feminist criminology became rather doctrinaire and theoretically one-
dimensional. Much feminist criminology continues to focus on violence against women, 
especially in the domestic sphere, and – generally speaking – the complex causes of male 
violence are reduced and simplified as mere context specific expressions of global patriarchy. 
This explanation for male violence is endlessly reproduced, and few scholars working in this 
tradition appear willing to deviate from it. Ultra-realists (for example Hall, 2012; Winlow and 
Hall, 2009; Winlow, 2012, 2014; Ellis, 2017; Ellis et al, 2017) have drawn on history, neuro-
science, philosophy and psychoanalysis, as well as sociology, cultural studies and socio-
economics, in their attempt to build new accounts of male violence that are more accurate and 
free from the kinds of sub-disciplinary protocols that have prevented feminist criminology 
moving forward.  
 
Left realists, too, advocated a return to reality. They hoped to dig underneath discourse and 
language to produce theories that could capture and explain the significant crime problems that 
arose as Keynesian social democracy drifted off into history to be replaced by an anti-social 
neoliberal order that remains with us still. Left realists began their project by simply 
acknowledging that criminals often inflict real harm on individuals and our shared 
environments. While left liberal radicals might have liked to find an element of class 
antagonism in the behaviours and choices of lower class criminals, the reality was – and is – 
very different. Working-class criminals for the most part victimise members of their own 
communities. Criminal entrepreneurs are not latter-day Robin Hoods fighting the good fight 
against an authoritarian social order. As both ultra-realists and deviant leisure scholars 
acknowledge, rather than kicking against an oppressive system, working-class criminals of 
both genders appear to be conforming to the competitive self-interest that lies at the system’s 
core (see Smith and Raymen, 2016a, b).  
 
Left realist scholars were willing to look again at capitalism, and, for ultra-realists, this is the 
most appealing aspect of their project. Left realists acknowledged that much of our cultural life 
is tied in a complex way to the core imperatives of the market. Capitalism itself – and the 
behaviours, attitudes and desires it cultivates in the social body – lies at the root of many of 
today’s most pressing social problems. Left realism’s intellectual intervention shed some light 
on the reality of crime and improved our discipline significantly. However, as time passed, it 
became clear that left realists were unwilling to abandon idealism entirely. ‘Moral panics’, a 
concept clearly rooted in idealism and the denial of reality (see Horsley, 2017), lingered on 
(see, for example, Young, 2009). Contemporary left realist accounts of riots and forms of 
political protest also remained unswervingly idealist. Corrosive self-interest and predatory 
violence, they acknowledge, are often an everyday feature of low-income neighbourhoods. 
However, they also claim that progressive politics exists in marginalised communities as a 
timeless fact of life, erupting into carnivalesque violence if the state allows the profit motive 
to disturb the raw but functional cultural life of the people (see Lea, 2013; Fitzgibbon, 2017). 
Lea (ibid) even goes as far as to suggest that contemporary rioters see and understand the 
totality of global capitalism and that their actions should be understood as a direct attempt to 
topple capital from its lofty perch. More importantly, despite the apparent radicalism of the left 
realist approach, key authors fell victim to an aspect of market ideology that, since the end of 
the Second World War, has sort to encourage us all to believe that capitalism is the best of all 
available economic systems, and that any conceivable alternative to it will lead inevitably to 
widespread destitution and, in all probability, industrial-scale slaughter (see Lea and Young, 
1993; see also Matthews, 2014). Once this basic feature of post-war capitalism’s ideological 
project was accepted, left realism inevitably became yet another reformist movement that sort 
only to petition government to ameliorate social problems by redistributing capital and 
providing adequate job opportunities and welfare systems.  
 
Elements of radical thought were certainly present in the left realist project, but when it came 
to the crunch most left realists were social democrats on economic issues and liberals on 
cultural issues. Rather than proposing forms of depth intervention that had the potential to cut 
problems off at the source, left realists hoped only to identify progressive and incremental 
social policies that seemed to possess the potential to reduce the suffering of marginalised 
populations. Ultimately, left realism failed to evolve and fell out of favour with younger 
criminologists keen to get to grips with an increasingly unjust and harmful twenty-first century 
capitalist system. Left realism also ignored subjectivity, fudged around root causes, and failed 
to develop a critical account of criminogenic post-68 consumer culture. While ultra-realists 
owe much to left realism’s drive to take crime seriously, the differences between the two 
approaches are too great for ultra-realists to identify their project as a direct descendant of left 
realism. Twentieth century critical realism has had a much greater impact upon the 
development of ultra-realism. 
 
Critical realism 
For ultra-realists, critical realism, and especially the work of Roy Bhaskar (1997), offers a 
much more stable intellectual platform upon which to build. However, ultra-realists disagree 
with the transcendental aspect of Bhaskar’s work that came increasingly to the fore towards 
the end of his life. Other critical realists, too, seem unable to truly dispense with the general 
idealist faith that we all possess the capacity to transcend structures, environments and our own 
biographies and sail off towards the heavens to live a moral life unimpeded by the horrors of 
the real world (see, for example, Archer, 2008). 
  
Critical realists begin by claiming that meaning and action are not genuinely autonomous. The 
meanings we ascribe to processes, events and our own biographies are inevitably influenced 
by the world around us and our experience of it, and our actions are, often unbeknownst to us, 
shaped by social relations, interdependencies, imperatives, events and experiences. These 
things form a totalising system, and they cannot be easily disaggregated. They inform one 
another at a fundamental level. Our experiences, our sense of self, our faith in our own agency, 
and so on, are tied up with and overlap other aspects of this totalising system. Bhaskar pushes 
past liberal sociology’s obsession with free-willed identity construction by identifying the 
‘non-identity’ that shapes our social experience. While liberals sing the lullaby of the self-
created moral agent capable of changing its life at a whim, Bhaskar’s point is to highlight the 
stark negativity and genuine contradictions that underpin the social world. Only knowledge of 
the structures and generative processes that shape our lives offers us the opportunity to improve 
things, and only by orientating activities towards this totality can our actions be considered 
properly political (see Hall and Winlow, 2015; Winlow et al, 2015).  
 
So, critical realists believe that we possess the ‘freedom’ to think and act, but they claim that 
this freedom occurs within a very limited sphere. Our choices are always tied to the options 
presented to us, and to the various meanings ascribed to those options. We retain a degree of 
agency with regard to an array of everyday choices, but, crucially, we simply do not have the 
capacity to enact our ‘freedom’ at a deeper level, at a level that shapes our experience of 
everyday reality. For example, we do not have the capacity to act at the level where deep-state 
politics and the intricacies of the global banking system are reproduced. Despite the supposed 
liberties of parliamentary democracy, we are not invited to offer a view on a whole range of 
issues that affect our everyday lives. Nor are we able to make decisions that affect whole 
communities, whole societies, our economic system or the natural environment. We have no 
access to these realms of concentrated power, and they remain, for the most part, beyond our 
immediate comprehension. From this basic ontological model, critical realists develop an 
epistemological model that enables us to grasp, in a very straightforward manner, the processes 
and forces that shape our experience of reality: 
 
1. Empirical level – the predominant space of social experience. Subjects interpret events 
using common forms of representative knowledge 
2. Actual level – the space of deep lying social processes that shape experience at the 
empirical level 
3. Real level – the space of fundamental forces and generative mechanisms. The processes 
of the actual and the experiences of the empirical all have their roots in the real  
 
Placed within this context, and put very simply, ultra-realists believe that criminologists must 
attempt to create causal chains that connect the negativistic experiences of the empirical realm 
to their fundamental causes that emanate from the real. Rather than simply describe harms, 
these harms must be identified as the outcomes of actual social processes, which in turn must 
be attached to the generative mechanisms that, ultimately, produce the various harms 
experienced by ordinary people. It is at this point that ultra-realism’s theoretical project 
develops an empirical project to sit alongside it. Quantitative methodologies can occasionally 
reveal patterns and social trends at the empirical level, but if we are to take the next step of 
connecting empirically identifiable phenomena to complex social processes and root causes, 
we need qualitative methods capable of getting underneath basic patterns of social behaviour 
to the motivations and justifications of criminal and non-criminal actors. Ultra-realists claim 
that establishing networks of ethnographic researchers can provide us with the data and analysis 
we need to push past mid-level theory and begin to get to grips with the forces that occupy the 
real. The first step is to identify what Hegel called the concrete universal – put simply, the 
small components of the totality that can be taken to be representative of the totality itself. 
Networks of ethnographers, working, for example, in high crime areas across the west, should 
be able to identify a concrete universal, present in each location, that represents the totality of 
the liberal capitalist system. The structures and dynamic processes of neoliberalism, for which 
market logic is the dominant organizing principle, have already hollowed out deindustrialised 
zones throughout Britain. It is now perfectly clear that this process has reshaped rates of crime, 
forms of crime and spurred the development of new criminal markets. It is not simply presence 
and action that are causative. Absence and inaction are also causative. The absence of 
solidarity, hope, real politics and stable and reasonably remunerative employment clearly 
inform social experience, and the absence of these things are connected to the onward march 
of neoliberal capitalism and its central principal of unequal exchange. Many individuals who 
live in marginalised social spaces have seen stable work and community life disappear and 
criminality and low-level disorder advance. Their experiences of decline and loss are examples 
of the historical concrete universals ultra-realists seek to investigate (see Winlow 2001; 
Winlow et al, 2017).  
 
While critical realism’s epistemological model is useful in encouraging critical thinking about 
the forces that shape the subject and its experience, there’s something important missing. Ultra-
realists generally argue that Lacan’s conception of the Real has greater utility for scholars 
interested in capturing the forces that shape human action and inaction and the conscious and 
unconscious life of the subject. For Lacan, the Real is occupied by forces and processes that 
cannot be symbolised. The Real retains an elemental attachment for the human subject, and it 
possesses the raw power to transform our world in unpredictable ways. The Real escapes our 
comprehension. We are simply agog in the face of it, literally without the words to make sense 
of it (see Winlow and Hall, 2013, for a more detailed ultra-realist exploration of the Lacanian 
Real). Ultra-realists have also argued that critical realists have failed to construct a 
thoroughgoing account of ideology. Crucially, critical realists do not acknowledge the post-68 
reversal of ideology, and the role the transformed structure of the dominant ideology has played 
in reproducing the conformity that lies underneath the surface diversity of the present epoch. 
During the modern era, the ruling ideology secured its dominance by ensuring that every 
individual worked to further the interests of capitalism while never becoming cognisant of the 
system’s reality or their role in its continuation. As Marx claimed, ideology was a matter of 
doing it without knowing it. However, postmodern capitalism secures its interest by doing 
exactly the opposite. Knowledge of capitalism’s dark side is now widely dispersed throughout 
the population. A good proportion of us can now at least begin to conceptualise the system, but 
our knowledge of its processes and effects does not prevent us for acting in accordance with 
the system’s interests. We know of the hollowness of our politics, of the increasingly bland and 
commercialised nature of popular culture, of the ecological effects of our consumption and 
travel. We know that the system as it currently stands concentrates wealth in the hands of a tiny 
portion of the overall population. However, this knowledge doesn’t act to inspire change. 
Rather it acts to prevent the supposedly ethical individual from seeking change. It immobilises 
the subject and encourages it to delegate its dissatisfaction and discomfort to an agency willing 
to act on its behalf. We are invited, indeed encouraged, to decry the vulgarity of our political 
elites, as long as we continue to vote. We are invited to complain about consumerism, as long 
as we continue to shop. We are invited to worry about ecological catastrophe, as long as we do 
not begin to demand significant structural intervention. The potentially emancipatory moment 
of revelation has passed, and nothing has changed. The subject is encouraged to imagine itself 
as ethical and knowledgeable, and not complicit in the continuation of the system as it stands. 
The archetypal capitalist subject these days articulates anti-capitalist rhetoric while lost in the 
pursuit of transcendental purity and awareness. The material world remains off limits.  
 
The reversal of ideology inspires what Zizek (2009b, passim) calls interpassivity (see Pfaller, 
2017, for an excellent account of the role of interpassivity in contemporary culture). We do not 
feel any great responsibility to engage in progressive politics, because we are told the system 
itself is already subject to sustained critique. Multinational corporations, for example, tend to 
do a lot of high-profile charitable giving, and those corporations that pollute our planet most 
also tend to be engaged in activities to limit climate change and reduce environmental 
degradation. Films produced by large multinational corporations often present large 
multinational corporations as the ultimate bad guy whose pursuit of profit negatively effects 
human societies. Our politicians are usually the first to decry corruption and the long-running 
failure of our elites to tackle the problems we face. Prime ministers utterly dedicated to 
breaking apart the welfare state tell us with a straight face that they are committed to ensuring 
the poor are reintegrated into our society and given the help they need to improve their lives. 
The system effectively stages its own critique in order to encourage all to conclude that what 
exists is contested, the will of the majority and subject to progressive and incremental change. 
The staging of critique acts to reassure increasingly cynical and depoliticised populations that 
nothing too strenuous is required of them, beyond marking a ballot paper every five years. We 
withdraw, but we are encouraged to retain the conceit that we see the system for what it is, and 
that we play no role in its continuation. We see cynicism and lethargy in those around us and 
wonder why it should be us that applies the effort and makes the sacrifices to drive forward 
developing political causes (see Winlow and Hall, 2013). The decrepit state of working-class 
political institutions and communities has hamstrung the left, but the reversal of ideology I 
have described very briefly above has worked in tandem with this process to enforce what 
Fisher (2009) calls capitalist realism – the general sense that capitalism can be neither 
overcome nor improved upon, and that any attempt to change things for the better will 
inevitably make things worse. 
 
One key part of Zizek’s critique of ideology, a part that has been used and extended by ultra-
realists, is his concept of fetishistic disavowal. Fetishistic disavowal plays a crucial ideological 
role in shaping our everyday experience of reality, and ultra-realists place great emphasis upon 
it in within their overall epistemological framework (see Winlow and Hall, 2009, 2012; Hall 
and Winlow, 2015). Fetishistic disavowal refers to the process of choosing to repress troubling 
forms of knowledge. Some forms of knowledge appear to us too difficult to be faced head on, 
and so we choose to forget these pieces of information and cast them out of consciousness so 
that the everyday rhythm of our lives can continue unimpeded. For example, we may repress, 
disregard or explain away information that appears to suggest our partner is having an affair. 
After the reality of the affair can no longer be denied, disavowed information about the affair 
may return to consciousness, and we may be forced to ask ourselves why we ignored clear 
signs that an affair was taking place for so long. The answer is straightforward: it is often easier 
for us not to know about things that threaten to destabilise our routines, identities and 
commitments. Such forms of disavowal have, since that collapse of the modern symbolic order 
(see Winlow and Hall, 2012, 2013), become a crucial ideological mechanism that prevents us 
from acting now to address the staggering range of titanic problems that lie before us.  
  
For ultra-realists, the fundamental problem with critical realism is the failure of its key 
proponents to fully dispense with the basic idealist faith in the existence of an eternal moral 
agent. Transcendental materialism, the intellectual framework developed by Zizek (passim) 
and extended by Johnston (2008), refuses to simply assume that there exists at the core of 
subjectivity an eternal moral presence that remains untouched by the prevailing totality. 
Instead, transcendental materialists construct a new and instructive account of the formative 
emergence of the subject through unconscious drives, desires, experiences and the hunger for 
coherent symbolism. Ultra-realists generally utilise the transcendental materialist model of 
subjectivity in their accounts of motivation, cause and harm. 
 
Lacan argued that lack exists at the core of subjectivity. Rather than a fundamental force 
residing at the core of our being, there simply exists a void, or the absence of a thing. This 
constitutive absence drives the subject to construct a coherent symbolic order to assuage the 
perennial explosions of internal and external stimuli for which, in the absence of coherent 
symbolism, it has no frame of reference. The subject solicits a symbolic order to escape the 
terror of the Real (see Hall, 2012,a, b). Once the symbolic order is in place, meaning can be 
ascribed to phenomena. The subject, keen to keep the terrors of the unsymbolisable Real at 
bay, enters the symbolic order and submits to its meanings, customs and rules. When the 
subject has faith in its symbolic order, the constitutive lack at the core of its being is effectively 
‘filled up’ with a symbolic substance that shapes desire.  
 
Transcendental materialism owes a great debt to Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan claimed that 
symbolic orders are held together by the Big Other. The Big Other, of course, does not really 
exist. Rather it is faith in the existence of the Big Other that sustains symbolic orders. We 
perform for the Big Other. We seek to live by his rules. Zizek advances Lacanian theory here 
by developing an account of the decline of symbolic efficiency and the death of the Big Other. 
One of the many appealing aspects of transcendental materialism is its relevance to the world 
we live in, a world in which many of the basic precepts of western modernity are breaking 
apart. Zizek’s account of symbolic efficiency rests upon faith. We believe that some aspect of 
our experience is rule governed, and proceed on that basis. For Zizek, the postmodern subject 
is denied access to the comfort of faith. We are forced to construct a cynical distance between 
ourselves and those things we are invited to believe in. 
 
I do not have the space to discuss in any depth transcendental materialism’s theory of the 
subject. Instead I urge you to track down key texts that offer a digest of this crucial area of 
study (see instead Johnston, 2008; Winlow and Hall, 2012, 2013; Hall and Winlow, 2015; 
Smith, 2014). All I will say at this stage is that we are not ‘hard wired’ for good or evil. Nor 
are we virtual automatons wound up and set in motion by our immediate social environment, 
and nor are we simply subjects forged by language and power. If we are ‘hard wired’ for 
anything, we are hard wired for plasticity. We can change, and when subjectivity changes, it 
changes in line with the real world and the forms of ideology that seek to represent it. The 
dominant accounts of subjectivity in the field of criminology are simply not up to the task of 
illuminating the interaction of the subject, the ideological field and the transformed 
environments in which we live.      
 
Conclusion 
Ultra-realists are dedicated to the task of confronting the staggering range of harms that are the 
inevitable product of neoliberal capitalism. Now is the time to discard out of date frameworks 
and step boldly into the twenty-first century to face climate change, mass migration, social 
disintegration, growing inequality and the plethora of new antagonisms opening up on the 
cultural field with the honestly and integrity such colossal problems demand. The cultural turn 
has taken us further and further away from reality and the material world upon which we 
depend. We need to get off this track and return to analyses of the real world. There is so much 
to do here. Once we accept that twentieth century sociological and criminological theory has 
little to teach us about the broad range of new harms we see before us, and that it is our job to 
construct new accounts of the zemiological field, we are free to utilise a much broader range 
of intellectual resources. Deviant leisure scholars have done precisely that, and published work 
in this area already displays a willingness to dispense with trite accounts of consumer choice 
and the rebelliousness of youth culture in order to get to grips with the problems and paradoxes 
of leisure in the dead space of contemporary popular culture. Deviant leisure scholars 
consistently seek to connect everyday social phenomena to their root causes, and they have 
already drawn upon cutting-edge social, cultural and psychoanalytic theory to explore the ways 
that market ideology shapes the drives, desires and gnawing anxieties of the postmodern 
subject. They remain dedicated to the task of disabusing liberal sociologists of their antiquated 
belief in the supposedly oppositional politics of leisure and consumption, and steadfast in their 
drive to reveal the harms associated with everyday consumer practice. In contemporary 
consumer economies and cultures, the traditional work/leisure binary appears no longer to be 
applicable. Our leisure practices are increasingly tied to the generation of surplus value, and 
corporations often utilise the tropes of leisure and freedom to advance their control of 
occupational cultures and work practices. Work increasingly bleeds into leisure and leisure into 
work. It is vital that we reconsider the entire field of leisure studies, and deviant leisure scholars 
are at the very forefront of this endeavour.  
 
My hope is that those involved in the developing field of deviant leisure can utilise ultra-
realism’s epistemological system to situate leisure and consumer phenomena in an appropriate 
analytical context. Furthermore, I believe key ultra-realist concepts – special liberty (see Hall, 
2012a), pseudo-pacification (ibid), the criminal undertaker (ibid), post-sociality (Winlow and 
Hall, 2013), the traumatised subject (Winlow, 2012, 2014, Ellis et al, 2017), and so on – can 
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